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Abstract—Secret-key generation in a wireless envi-
ronment exploiting the randomness and reciprocity
of the channel gains is considered. A new channel
model is proposed which takes into account the effect
of reflections (or re-radiations) from receive antenna
elements, thus capturing an physical property of prac-
tical antennas. It turns out that the reflections have
a deteriorating effect on the achievable secret-key rate
between the legitimate nodes at high signal-to-noise-
power-ratio (SNR). The insights provide guidelines in
the design and operation of communication systems
using the properties of the wireless channel to prevent
eavesdropping.
I. Introduction
Secret-key generation based on the randomness of the
wireless channel has gained much attention recently, since
it provides a low-cost and yet effective alternative to
existing higher layer approaches. The basic concept relies
on certain properties of channel statistics, especially on
the fact that spatial correlation of the channel decreases
rapidly with distance [1]. First results on exploiting de-
pendent (or common) source of randomness to generate a
secret key have been provided by Maurer [2] and Ahlswede
and Csiszar [3]. The largest achievable key rate (in bits
per source symbol) without leaking any information to a
possible eavesdropper is termed the secret-key capacity. In
wireless communication, a possible source for generating
secret keys is the wireless channel itself. Thus, different ap-
proaches have been proposed utilizing the characteristics
of the channel to generate secret keys. There have been
many publications regarding the theoretical and practical
aspects of secret-key generation such as [4]–[9]. Recently,
physical experiments have been conducted providing an
estimate of the achievable secret key rate in indoor en-
vironments [10]. It was shown that the characteristics
of the channel essential for generating secure keys, such
as reciprocity between legitimate nodes and the spatial
decorrelation, are not always met in practice. It was also
shown recently that the coherence time of the channel
plays a significant role in obtaining secret keys [11], and
that additional measures have to be taken into account
to ensure secure communication. Based on those results,
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one might argue that channel models traditionally used for
communications without secrecy constraints might result
in too optimistic outcomes when used for secure com-
munication analysis. If too simplistic models are utilized
to estimate the achievable secret-key rates, they do not
fully consider the underlying physics relevant for secret
key generation, which is the focus of this work.
From prior work, it is clear that several pitfalls occur
in practical realizations. The authors of [12] investigate
the case when the wireless channel exhibits a sparsity
pattern that increases the eavesdropper’s ability to observe
the main channel. In another work [13] it is shown that
antennas scatter a significant amount of power. This power
might be intercepted by an eavesdropper, who can use
the reflected signal to draw conclusions about the current
channel state between the legitimate users. Furthermore,
the authors present a method how the eavesdropper can
reconstruct the impact of simple environments on the
channel state.
Thus, a new channel model is proposed which captures
the phenomenon of reflection occurring at any real world
antenna. It turns out that, by taking the reflection into
account, the achievable secret-key rate is decreasing as the
signal-to-noise ratio at the eavesdropper is at moderate
to high levels. Therefore there is a optimal signal-to-noise
ratio to maximize the achievable secret-key rate, which has
to be taken into account when designing systems.
The paper is organized as follows: In section II, the
new system model is introduced. Section III outlines the
physical effects from antenna theory that establish the
power reflection. In section IV, the general bounds on
secret-key rates are formulated, while in sections V and VI
the bounds are computed and evaluated for special cases.
Section VII concludes the paper.
II. System model
When the training signals are exchanged at the legiti-
mate users, four signals can be defined as follows:
yA = hBAx+ zA (1)
yB = hABx+ zB (2)
yE1 = hAEx+ zE1 (3)
yE2 = hBEx+ zE2. (4)
The overall communication setup is shown in figure 1. The
legitimate users Alice and Bob exchange training signals in
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Fig. 1: Illustration of exchanged signals at the users.
order to estimate correlated channel coefficients. The de-
terministic training symbol x is set to x = 1 in the follow-
ing for convenience without loss of generality. The channel
coefficients hBA, hAB , hAE , hBE are assumed to have a
joint probability distribution P (hBA, hAB , hAE , hBE). All
noise terms zA, zB , zE1, zE2 are i.i.d. N (0, 1) distributed.
Furthermore, they are independent of all channel coeffi-
cients. From the training signal Bob has sent, Alice obtains
yA, which she can use to estimate hBA. On the other hand,
Bob receives yB , in order to estimate hAB . Very often, hBA
and hAB are just dependent, but not equal due to non-
ideal reciprocity. Eve receives the training signal directly
from Alice and Bob in yE1 and yE2, respectively.
Since reflection at the antenna might severely affect
the overall security of the key agreement approach, it is
reasonable to extend the basic model. The malicious, but
passive eavesdropper Eve intercepts the training signals
and, in addition, its reflections. Therefore, Eve obtains two
more observations:
yE3 = αhBAhAEx+ zE3 (5)
yE4 = αhABhBEx+ zE4. (6)
Here, it is assumed that the eavesdropper has the ca-
pability of decoupling all four received signals eqs. (3)
to (6) without interference, e.g., by using multi-antenna
techniques. Some amount of power is reflected at Alice’s
antenna and re-radiated as new transmitted signal, which
can be observed by Eve in yE3. The parameter α with
|α| < 1 describes the proportion of Alice’s received
signal that is reflected. This parameter comprises all
contributions to the reflection like the re-radiation, the
impedance mismatch and the structural scattering, which
are described in more detail in section III. Accordingly
Eve’s observation yE4 stems from the reflection at Bob’s
antenna. Again the noise terms zE3, zE4 are i.i.d. N (0, 1)
distributed.
ZCH ZRZA ZL
Fig. 2: Receiver system with antenna impedance ZA,
transmission line impedance ZCH, receiver impedance ZR
and overall load impedance ZL at the feed point [15].
III. Sources of reflection
From past work on antenna theory [14]–[16], three pos-
sible sources of reflections can be identified.
1) Some power reflection might result from impedance
mismatches in the receiver network. Relevant mis-
matches can occur in any elements close to the an-
tenna (see figure 2). Usually the antenna impedance
ZA is conjugately matched to the load impedance
ZL in order to achieve maximum power throughput.
However, optimal power transfer for ZA = Z∗L
might conflict with the goal of minimizing reflec-
tions, which yields ZA = ZL.
2) The current flow inside the receiving antenna con-
tributes to the reflection. Even with perfectly
matched circuits, some amount of power is not fed
into the circuit but re-radiated in a scattering field
instead.
3) The antenna structure itself introduces a scattering
field. This field depends on the structure, shape
and material of the antenna and has a different
directivity pattern than the re-radiated scattering
field.
Scattered and re-radiated portions of power from the
receiving antenna are related to a scattering field. In
literature, the total scattering field is often described as
the superposition of two components
~ES = ~ES(ZL =∞)− VOC
ZL + ZA
~Er. (7)
The component ~Er is the scattering field re-radiated by
the antenna for unit input current. On the other hand,
~ES(ZL = ∞) denotes the scattering field in case of an
open-loop circuit at the antenna feed point. Furthermore,
VOC the induced voltage at the antenna feed point, ZA the
antenna impedance and ZL the complex load impedance.
The antenna impedance is obtained by
ZA = Rl +Rr + jXA, (8)
where Rl is the loss resistance, Rr the radiation resistance
and XA the antenna reactance. A popular model to
describe the behaviour of an antenna in reception mode
is the The´venin model, which is depicted in figure 3. It is
a good approximation at least for dipole antennas which
operate close to the resonance frequency. The model as-
sumes the same antennas at transmitter and receiver (full
reciprocity) which are located in far field with respect to
3ZL
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Fig. 3: The´venin equivalent circuit for a receiving antenna.
each other. In addition the antennas should be small, the
dielectric without loss and the ground ideal. As depicted
in figure 3, the model basically characterizes a series RLC
circuit. A current flowing through the radiation resistance
Rr contributes to the scattering field of the antenna, which
is basically captured by ~Er in (7). In order to evaluate
the impact of re-radiation in more detail, some power
calculations are made on the basis of The´venin equivalent
circuit. To make following calculations simpler, a perfectly
conjugate matched load is assumed.
ZL = Z∗A = Rl +Rr − jXA (9)
Now the complex power that is fed into the load at the
receiver side can be calculated.
SL =
1
2ULI
∗
L =
1
8
ZL
(Rl +Rr)2
V 2OC (10)
So the power output into the load is
PL = ReSL =
1
8
V 2OC
(Rl +Rr)
, (11)
while the power dissipated as heat is
Pl =
1
8
Rl
(Rl +Rr)2
V 2OC (12)
and finally the re-radiated power is
Pr =
1
8
Rr
(Rl +Rr)2
V 2OC (13)
Using eqs. (11) to (13), the total power at the receiver side
is
Ptotal = PL + Pl + Pr =
1
4
V 2OC
(Rl +Rr)
. (14)
From these considerations, one can define a re-radiation
ratio
r = Pr
Ptotal
= 12
Rr
(Rl +Rr)
(15)
This straightforward result means that for a completely
lossless antenna always half the total power is re-radiated.
However, this result does not fully capture the total
scattering power since the component ~ES(ZL = ∞) from
(7) is not considered, which is the residual electric field
if the feed circuit is open and no current flows. While
capturing the impact of (15) in secret-key generation is
a future research topic of itself, here we employ the basic
model given in (5) and (6) with a coefficient α to evaluate
the essential impact the reflections might have on secret-
key rates. This is further justified by the investigations
of [13], in which it was shown by practical measurements
that a significant amount of power is scattered from the
receiver side for an antenna in open-loop mode.
IV. Secret-key rates
The overall setup refers to the source-type model with
wiretapper of [3], where the legitimate users agree on a
secret key. The observations at Alice, Bob and Eve are
interpreted as the outputs of memoryless, but correlated
sources. The upper bound on the secret key rate is there-
fore [3]
RSK = I (yA; yB |yE1, yE2, yE3, yE4)
= h (yA|yE1, yE2, yE3, yE4)
− h (yA|yB , yE1, yE2, yE3, yE4) , (16)
while the lower bound is [2]
RSK = I (yA; yB)
−min (I (yA; yE1, yE2, yE3, yE4) ,
I (yB ; yE1, yE2, yE3, yE4)) . (17)
In the following, some assumptions of the model
from section II are simplified. The channel
coefficients hBA, hAB , hAE , hBE are assumed to be
Gaussian distributed with zero mean and variances
σ2BA, σ
2
AB , σ
2
AE , σ
2
BE , respectively. Furthermore, hBA,
hAB are independent of hAE and hBE . This assumption
is justified if Eve is located further away from Alice and
Bob such that the channel coefficients undergo a rapid
spatial decorrelation. As a consequence, the observations
yE1 from (3) and yE2 from (4) can be neglected for
all rate calculations since they are independent of all
other observations. The channel coefficients hAB and
hBA are correlated with ρAB , while hAE and hBE are
correlated with ρE . Furthermore, the variances of the
legitimate users’ channels are set to σ2 = σ2AB = σ2BA
and for the eavesdropper’s channels to σ2E = σ2AE = σ2BE .
Conclusively, there are only four observations to consider:
yA = hBA + zA
yB = hAB + zB
yE3 = αhBAhAE + zE3
yE4 = αhABhBE + zE4 (18)
The SNR at Alice’ and Bob’s receiver is
SNR = SNRAlice = SNRBob = σ2,
while Eve’s SNR is equal to
SNREve = α2σ2Eσ2 = α2σ2ESNR,
since only the reflected observations are considered.
Finally, for comparison, we derive secret-key rates if
the reflection is not taken into account. In this case the
4eavesdropper does not have any observation at all and the
secret-key capacity is
CSK = I(yA; yB) = h(yA) + h(yB)− h(yA, yB)
= 12 log2
(
1 + σ2
)2
(1 + σ2)2 − ρ2ABσ4
= 12 log2
(1 + SNR)2
(1 + SNR)2 − ρ2ABSNR2
(19)
The next sections concern the question of deriving
closed-form solutions for the bounds of (16) and (17).
V. Key rates without CSIE
In this section, Eve has no CSIE (channel state infor-
mation at the eavesdropper), i.e. the channel coefficients
hAE and hBE are unknown to her. The upper bound on
the secret-key rate is
RSK = I (yA; yB |yE3, yE4)
= h (yA|yE3, yE4)− h (yA|yB , yE3, yE4) (20)
= h(yA, yE3, yE4) + h(yB , yE3, yE4)
− h(yA, yB , yE3, yE4)− h(yE3, yE4) (21)
while the definition of mutual information is used in (20)
and the chain rule of entropies in (21). The lower bound
is accordingly
RSK = I (yA; yB)−
min (I (yA; yE3, yE4) , I (yB ; yE3, yE4))
= h (yA) + h (yB)− h (yA, yB)− h (yE3, yE4)
−min{(h (yA)− h (yA, yE3, yE4) ,
h (yB)− h (yB , yE3, yE4))} (22)
= h (yB)− h (yA, yB)−
h (yE3, yE4) + h (yA, yE3, yE4) (23)
while in (22) the chain rule of entropies is applied again
and (23) exploits the fact that yA and yB are identically
distributed. Therefore the entropies of yA and yB are the
same and (22) takes the minimum of equal values.
Since the multivariate distributions from (22) and (23)
are non-Gaussian due to the reflection terms yE3 and yE4,
we use entropy estimators to calculate the joint entropies.
The entropy estimation utilizes a combination of the k-
nearest neighbor estimator (NNE) from [17] and a kernel
density estimator (KDE) from [18]. The results of the
simulation for the special case σ2E = 1 are illustrated in
figure 4. This case covers the situation when the power of
the training symbols is increased by the legitimate users in
order to have improved SNR, but Eve benefits from that
as well. The simulation reveals that, for relatively small
SNR, the key rate is almost unaffected by Eve’s presence.
However, at a certain SNR, the lower and upper bound
diverge and decrease. Furthermore it turns out that the
parameter α determines the width of the lower bound’s
maximum. The parameter basically has a “retarding”
effect on the point when the rate drops, so for a small α
the maximum broadens. In addition, the parameter ρAB
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Fig. 4: Estimated bounds of reflection model without CSIE
and parameters ρAB = 0.9, α = 0.05, ρE = 0.1.
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Fig. 5: Achievable key rates of the reflection model without
CSIE and parameters ρAB = 0.9, α = 0.05, ρE = 0.1. The
values at the colorbar denote the key rates in bits per
channel use.
defines the saturation level for high SNR. Surprisingly even
with negligible noise at the eavesdropper, a positive secret-
key rate is still possible. This might be due to the fact that
Eve always encounters her unknown channel coefficients,
which impede her in the estimation of hAB or hBA.
If we consider the more general case, i.e. if σ2E can be
chosen arbitrarily, the lower bound is depicted in figure 5.
For low SNR at Alice’s receiver, no secret-key agreement
is possible. However, for higher SNR, there is always a
positive secret-key rate regardless of how accurate Eve’s
observation might be. The lower bound of figure 4 is
retrieved as a special case, if one cuts through the plane
of figure 5 in a line parallel to the main diagonal with
SNREve(dB) = SNRAlice(dB) + 20 log10(α).
VI. Key rates with CSIE
Another scenario comes into play if Eve knows her
channel coefficients perfectly, thus she has full CSIE. The
bounds of (16) and (17) are then conditioned on hAE and
hBE , respectively. As a consequence, the model from (18)
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Fig. 6: Secret-key rates with full CSIE and parameters
ρAB = 0.9, α = 0.05, ρE = 0.1.
simply reduces to the multivariate Gaussian case. There-
fore, one need to average over all possible realizations of
the channel coefficients in order to calculate average rates.
The upper bound is obtained by
RSK = I (yA; yB |yE3, yE4, hAE , hBE)
= EhAE ,hBE {I {yA; yB |yE3, yE4,
hAE = hˆAE , hBE = hˆBE}}. (24)
and the lower bound by
RSK = I (yA; yB)−min {I (yA; yE3, yE4, hAE , hBE) ,
I (yB ; yE3, yE4, hAE , hBE)} (25)
= I (yA; yB)− I (yA;hAE , hBE)
− I (yA; yE3, yE4|hAE , hBE) (26)
= I (yA; yB)− EhAE ,hBE {I {yA; yE3, yE4|
hAE = hˆAE , hBE = hˆBE}}, (27)
where in (25) the minimum of equal terms of mutual
information is taken since they both depend on random
variables with the same distribution. In (26) the chain rule
of mutual information is utilized and (27) exploits the fact
that hAE and hBE are independent of Alice’s observation.
The result is illustrated in figure 6 and in addition in
figure 7 for the case of full reciprocity. Compared to
the case without CSIE, both bounds are dropping to
zero when Eve’s SNR increases. Thus full CSIE means
the worst-case scenario in terms of secret-key rate. More
specific, the terminals obtain the observations of (18),
but now the channel coefficients hAE and hBE are fully
known by the eavesdropper. The resulting achievable key
rates are illustrated in figure 8. Now the saturation level
has vanished for higher values of SNREve. Naturally Eve
obtains a profound knowledge of the channel coefficient for
high SNR, therefore no positive secret-key rate is possible.
VII. conclusion
In this paper, the impact of reflections, a phenomenon
present at any practical antenna, on the secret-key rate
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Fig. 8: Achievable key rates of the reflection model with
CSIE and parameters ρAB = 0.9, α = 0.05, ρE = 0.1.
The values at the colorbar denote the key rates in bits per
channel use.
based on the randomness of the wireless channel was
investigated. At first, the rather optimistic case without
channel state information at the eavesdropper (CSIE) was
considered. At low SNR, the secret-key rates are almost
unaffected by eavesdropping. From a certain point on, the
key rates drop due to Eve’s observations, depending on
the antenna reflection. At high SNR the key rate might
still be positive since Eve is impeded by the unknown
channel realizations. The saturation level at high SNR
is mostly determined by the correlation of Alice’s and
Bob’s observations. Considering the more realistic case of
full CSIE, however, the lower bound drops significantly
without a saturation level at high SNR since Eve learns
the information on the key error-free due to the reflec-
tions from the antennas of the legitimate nodes. As a
consequence, there exists an optimal SNR for which the
secret key rate is maximal and otherwise is less due to the
effect of additive noise in the communication chain or the
reflections at the antennas.
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